Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 4, number 1 (Indexation, The Brazilian Experience by Ephraim Kleiman
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 4, number 1 (Indexation, The Brazilian Experience




Chapter Title: Monetary Correction and Indexation: The Brazilian and Israel Experience
Chapter Author: Ephraim Kleiman
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9237
Chapter pages in book: (p. 141 - 176)140 Roberto B M
Baer, Werner arid Beckerman, Paul. "Inflation without Distortiijnco
An Fva(uatio5
us Brazil's Indexing System.World Development 2 (Oc(ober.Decemher
1974; 354' Carva(ho, Livio R. A/. Pnncipios e Appleaç,)o cia l'ii/iti(,i Saiarjal Pn5I 964 Dis(
0550, Paper No. 9, Universidade de Brasilia, Departamento rio tcon1
l<73
Costa, Ramonaval A Size Distnhut,on ci Brazil in/ i)7: A ( ruc5_Si'it,
Anaivs15 income Distribution by Occupations. Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt
Unversity, 1975 DIEESE (Departamento Intersindical de EstatIstica e Estudos Sócio
Economic05;Oez /\fl05 do P011/IC a Salarial. Estudos EconOmicos No. 3, Sao Paulo1975
Doeringer, P. 8. and Piore, M. J. Internal Labor Markets and Manpower
'naf1,5 Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1971.
Fishlow, Albert. "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income," Amer,san
f(OflUnj( Review62 (May 1972): 391-402.
."Indexing BrazilianStyle:Inflation without Tears?" Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity No.1,I 974, 261 -280.
Hoffman, Rodolfo and Duane, joo Carlos. "A Distribujco deRenda no Brasil "Rev5
de Administraçao de Empresas 12 (June 1972): 46-66.
t.angoni, Carlos C. Distribuiçäo da Renda e Desenvolvi,nentoEconOmjco d Bras;)
Rio de Janeiro: Editora Expressao e CuRura, 1973.
Macedo, Roberto B. M. Models of he Densanci SocLabor and the ProblemoLabor Absorption in the Brazilian Manutacturing Sector. Ph.D.Dissertation HarvardUnjvr. sity,1974.
.. . "Atgumas Dificutdades na lnterpretaco dos Dados do Salárjoe Sa(ánjo Mf'o
da IndOstnia." Plane jarnenro e Conjuntura 79(August 1974)' 63-67.
Rezende da Sitva, Fernando A. Avaliacâo do SetorPublic0 na Econornja Brasik'ira
Ri de Janeiro: I.P.E.A.-I.N.P.E.5,, 1972.
Supiicy, Eduardo M. "Alguns Aspectos da PoliticaSalarial." Revista deAdministraçao de Enupresas 14 (September 1974): 32-45.
lb.Tolipan, Ricardo and Tinelli, Arthur Carlos,eds. A Controvercja SobreDustribwçao d Renda e Desenvolv,mentoRio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1975.
von Doellinger, Carlos and Cavalcantu, LeonardoC. E'npresas Muirinacjonajsna indüs- tria Brasj/euaRio de Janeiro: I.P.E.A._l.N,P.E,S,,1975
Wells, John. "Distribution of Earnings,Growth, and Structure of Demandin Brazil During the Sixties." WorldDevelopment 2 (January 1974)' 9-24.
I[PHRAIM KLEIMAN





The growing interest which indexationproposals have attracted indevel-
oped economies in recent years hasinevitably raised the questionwhether
jndexation has been a success in the countrieswhere it was adopted in the
past and whether the latter'sexperience could berepeated elsewhere. This
paper compares the operationof indexation in two ofthe three countries
where it has been extensively practiced:
Brazil arid lsrael.i Without pre-
suming that such a comparison can answerthe questions raisedabove, I
hope that, by pointing out the similaritiesand differences in theexperi-
ences of these two countriesit may provide someinsight into the rele-
vance of indexation to solvingproblems faced by others.
The advocates of indexation sometimestend to regard it as a panaceafor
all inflationary ills, while its critics tend to deprecateit for not beingthat.
To keep the limits of the present discussionclear, let me start,therefore,
with an attempt to define what is meant here byindexatiOn and whatthe
ends areitis supposed to serve.Basically, indexationOrmonetary
correction, as it is sometimes calledis aprocedure of automaticad just-
ments of nominal values, used as a deviceto minimizethe social and
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economic costs 01 ifltlatIOil. Consider tirsi the case where inilation
devel. opc tinexpectedlv. after a period of price ctahi IitySince it wasnot taken
into accou nt in the formulation of cx isti rig noni i na Icontractstheir real
outcomes will ex post differ from those envisaged by the cx ante
premises on the basis of which they were signed; and the divergence bete0
the two sets of outcomes w;l be greater the longer the period of the
COntract and the smaller the possibility of reopening it during itsOriginallyagreed. upon lifetime.Itis these conditions which give rise tothecommon conclusion thatinflationresults in the redistribution of
income from
creditors to debtors and, to a lesser extent (for wagecontracts arcgenerai, of shorter duration), from labor income to profits. Unless
inflationwas induced expressly for this purpose, the resultant redistributionis one ofits major social costs.Itwill also result in a waste ofresources Caused
attempts to force the revision of contracts through suchacts as strikes
Furthermore, some resource misallocation may alsooccur, since the real
price actually paid for goods and services supplied under
existing Contracts
is artificially lowered below their future replacementcost.
Suppose now that inflation persists. The values at whichnew Contracts
are now signed may be expected to take into account future declines
in the
purchasing power of money. And it is sometimes arguedthat if they do this
correctlyi.e., if the expected rate of inflationincorporated intopresent
contracts is the one that will, in fact,materialize__continued inflation will
result in no further distributive or allocativecosts beyond those incurredn
the initial stages and, from the point ofview of the individual, theinflation
tax on the cash balances he voluntarily choosesto hold (which may turn
out to be less distortive thanany other alternative tax considered). How.
ever, this argument abstracts from both marketimperfections and the
uncertainty factor inherent in inflationarysituations. Economic agents
should be regardedas faced not by a point expectation of inflation,but
rather by a spectrum of inflationaryvalues, with different probabilities
attached to them. If,as we may assume, they are risk-averters, lenders will
then demand a nominalinterest rate which incorporatesnot only an
element of compensation forthe expected (mean) decreasein the value of
money but also a premium tocompensate them for the extra risk element
involved; and, fora similar reason, the nominalrate offered by borrowers,
while augmented by theexpected rate of inflation, will alsoincorporate a
negative, clisagio elenient, reflectingtheir aversion froni thissame risk. The
effect of uncertaintyon the ex-ante real interest rate dependson the relative
strength of risk-aversionin the twogroups; but whatever its direction, it
will result ina decrease in the total volurniecleared in the marketi.e. ii
the total volumeof saving and investment.1As uncertainty increases with
the length of thetime horizon, this lastresult will be accompanied bya










































contrai_ts.With the collapse ofthe capital market, the silvings rio longer
channelled into it arediverted, partly to current consumption, and partly to
direct realinvestnlent-111particularto stockpiling and the l)lirChaSC of
real estateand durable consumergoods. Thus, evenvhc'n prices and
interest rates canadjust in full to inflationaryexpectations (but With uncer-
tainty present)resource misallocationis unavoidable. And it, cx post, the
rates of inflationturn out to differfrom those expected, a redistribution of
income willbe added to it.
In the absenceof institutional and legal restrictions,market institutions
may beexpected to adjust to this situation,albeit often with a costly time
lag. One suchform of adjustment mayhe recoritractirig, allowing the
frequent renegotiationof existing contracts and obligations.However, such
adjustments are farfrom being costless. Theproblem is therefore one of
choosing that adjustmentsystem which will becheapest to operate, both
in terms of the amountof misallocation and redistributionit will be unable
to prevent andin terms of the actual costsof operation. Indexation can be
viewed as a device simulatingthe market adjustments made necessaryby
inflation, but at a lower cost.To illustrate, considerdevelopments in the
labor market in ademand-pull inflation, such as isbrought about in full
employment by governmentdeficit financing. Under conditionsof pure
competition, as output pricesrise, and with them alsothe value of marginal
product of labor, individualfirms will try to attractworkers from their
competitors by offers of highernominal wages. Equilibriumwill finally he
re-establishedat the same real wage asbefore, but not before some
reshuffling of labor among enterpriseshas taken place.Alternatively, with a
highly unionized labor market, theinitial fall in real wageswill result in
demands for nominal wage risesbefore the expirationof existing wage
contracts. In both cases, someworking time will helost, either in the
process of workers' transitionfrom one firm to another orthrough industrial
disputes. Assuming the change in the pricelevel to be the onlychange that
has taken place, the same adjustmentcould be attainedthrough wage
contracts stipulating that thenominal wage will beraised proportionatelY
whenever the price level rises. In this case,however, noman-days would
be lost.
It follows from the aboveexample that.to constitute acost-Saving
simulation device, indexation has to eilslirein advancethe automatic
adjustment of nominal values to the pricelevel. Otherwise, itwill be
unable to prevent the operation of thealternative, morecostly, mecha-
nisms. In particular, this will happenwith so-called "ex-anteindexations"
whenever the inflation rate realized divergesfrom thatpostulated in them.
(Nor can ex-ante indexation removethe expectationduced misalloca-
tions due to the risk element mentionedearlier.) Theassumptions made in
our illustration also bring out the factthat indexationis not a substitutetormechanisms providing adjustmentto changes other than tha' in thepur.
chasing value of money. Thus,if the rise in the general price level
v"ere
accompanied by changes in the structureof demand requiring, inturn a
change in the real wage or in therelative wages of differentgroups oi
workers, they would not be taken careof by indexation: as itsalternative
name implies, indexationis designed to provide only monetary (nominal)
corrections, not real ones.
in the example, indexationneutralizes the effects of inflationon both
real wages and realprofits, and therefore also on the distributionot
income. Suppose, however, that the rise in the price level was due to, sa,,
a worsening of the country's termsof trade. This amounts to a decreaseii)
the real value of national income which, under competitive condition5
would affect all income groups. Insofar as full indexation protects the real
income of any one of them, say, labor vis--vis capital or lenders vis-a-vjs
borrowers,it can no longer simultaneously neutralize the effects of the
inflation on the distribution of income, its effects will then be similar to
those o an attempt of one econcrnic group to increase its share of the
national income at the expense of another. Finally, while indexation may
slow down inflationary pressures if the actual inflation rate turns out to be
lower than expected, in the opposite case it may enhance it (though, at the
same time, doing away with some of the negative distributive and alloca.
tive effects by means of which inflation would otherwise be slowed down).
But basically, it is not an anti-inflationary device and should not be judged
as such.
It is with these reservations in mind that we can now turn to the way
ndexation has actually been operating. As the Brazilian experience has
been widely treated at this conference,Ifirst survey the way indexatiori
evolved in Israel and then proceed to compare the experiences of the two
countries.
till INDEXATION IN ISRAEI
History
lndexatiori was first introduced in what isnow Israel in the early years 01
World War II. With the intention of avoiding the frequent industr
disputes that could be expected to result from therise in the cost of living.
the British government of Palestine encouragedan agreement between the
trade union federation andgroups of industrial employers thatlinked
wages to prices through a cost-of-living allowance. Over the years, the
coverage of this agreement was extended to applyto almost all eniploY'





Theinkirig otfinancial instruments came inthe wake of the brief
runawayinflation thatfollowed the establishment of the stateof Israel in
j948. The veryprimitive tax systeniinherited from the Britsh administra-
tion, aswell as a certainlack ot economic sophistication,caused the Israeli
government to resortto the printing press tofinance the 1943 war and the
absorption of massimmigration. An attempt to repressinflation through
price controlSand rationing, at firstsuccessful, could not withstand the
growing pressuresfor long. By the beginningof 1952 the printing of money
wascurtailed and priceswere allowed to risein order to Wipe out the
public's excesspurchasing power. As aresult of the latter decision, the
index ofofficial retail prices roseby nearly 60 percent in that yearalone.3
Such a development
could not but destroy any moneyillusion people
night havenourished until then.
unwilling to refrainfrom all transactionsinvolving a time element,
households arid firmsbegan searching for unitsof value alternative to the
purely nominal one.In particulars theyhad to find devices whithwould
make possible to contractand repay debts. Themaking of actual payments
in gold or foreignexchange notes washeavily restricted by theprohibition
on trade inthe former and onboth trade in and possessionof the latter. As
an alternative,contracting partiesresorted to the local blackmarket prices
of gold and dollarsand the rate of theIsraeli pound (IL) onthe Zurich
exchange as a constant measureof value. Thus, paymentswere made in IL,
but their size waslinked to the price of somegood. in this case thatof
foreign exchange. Butcontracts based on ablack market price arenot
easily enforceable in the courts,nor can theybe expected to belooked
upon favorablyby the authorities.The use of this typeof linkage was
thereforelimitedtotransactionsbetweensmall,lamily-owned
enterprisesof which, however,the majority of theprivate sector ofthe
economy thenconsisted.Itcould not be resortedto by thefew big
companies trying toraise capital onthe market. Sonicof them tried,
instead, to issue bonds whosenominal value waslinked to the priceof the
goods they produced. However,the legality of eventhis outpUt5Pehic
linkage was in sonic doubt becauseof an old anti-usurylaw dating hack to
the days of the Ottoman empire,which set an upperlimit on thenominal
interest rate. (This explainsalso why nominalinterest ratescould not fulfil
their expected function by adjustingto take accountof inflationaryexpec-
tations.)
As long as the governmentfinanced itself bypractically unlimitedloans
from the central bank (or, as wasthen the case,from the issuedepartment).
it had, of course, no incentiveeither to raisethe legal rate otinterest or to
offer any but nominal repayment.At the sametime,it made noeffort,
either, to secure the linkage ofthe funds itlent to privateenterprises






















government credits seemsto have been the lear thatthis wouldi
interpreted as a sign that the goverrliii('ntexpe(te(I intlaton to persist,thus
adding fuel to the inflationarybonfire.1 The situation changed when,tinder
the preSsure 01 ha lance-ol-paynlentsconsiderations, the governni(fl
cided to curtail its borrowingfrom the issue department and tried toraise
money by loansIroni the general public. Nut wishing to discourage
investment, and regarding interestprimarily as a cost COflul)oflentwhich
could push up prices, it was unwilling totamper w!th the legal Ceilingon
interest rates. But the lottery prizes itoilered instead were not sufficientto
induce the public to buy governmentbonds. At the same time it became
evident that the real value of the government's outstanding credit would be
greatly reduced by the time of its repayment. Combined with the business
sector's need of a stable value standard, the government's financial re-
quirements led, by the mid-i 950s, to the adoption of widespread linkage
The first government constant-value bonds, linked to the official foreign
exchange (i.e., dollar) rate, came into hx?Ing almost unintentionally. They
were issued in 1950 to compensate ownersof foreign securities for their
forced purchase by the state at the overvalued officialate of the Israel
poLind.' The successive devaluations of the IL in the early I 950s convinced
the public of the validity of the linkage clause. ,\nd from 1954 onward the
government had to offer either dollar or price level linkages for its bond
issues to be acceptable to the pul)IiC. The introduction of linkage in
government borrowing inevitably raised the question of its extension to
government lending as well. lii 1955 the government accepted the recorn-
riiendation of a Public commission set up for that purpose that linkage he
required on all state credits extended for a period of two or more years. B
the end of the decade linkage of niedium- and long-run financial contracts
was almostuniversally accepted.Not onlyregularloans,butalso
mortgages, life insurance, arid saving deposits acquired linkage clauses,
which were even extended to some commercial bills. On the whole, the
two value standards used were the official exchange rate of the U.S. dollar
arid the Consumer Price Index (CPI). There were, however, some minor
exceptions: for example, the value of down payments in certain housing
schemes was linked to a construction cost index tor the purpose of final
settlement. As a rule, both principal and interest were linked. The choice of
standard, at least in credits emanating from the government, was optional,
and some private credits had mixed linkage (by which changes in the U.S.
dollar rate and the CPI each applied toone half of a loan's initial nominal
value).
After the massive (levaluatons of the earlyI 950s, the government
preferred to cope with balance-of-paynient problems by varying the eec-

























share of itsinternal debt wasdollar-hnked. Its protessed revulsion from
devaluation
caused many of itsdebtors to Opt tor dollar linkage.1hniigh
inflatioflhad beenconsiderably slowed down bythen, the realvalue'of
their currentinterest and repaymentburden was nevertheless reduced by
more than onequarter between19Sand 1961. This fool's paradise was
rudely shatteredby the 1962devaluation of the IL, from 1 .8 to 3.0 tothe
dollar. As this wasaccompanied by some downwardscaling of tariffs and
export subsidi,its full impact wasin the main reserved forfinancial assets
and liabilities.The shock of havingtheir outstanding debt increasesud-
denly by 67 Percent
created considerable unrest amongthe governments
debtors. Thegovernment had to bow topolitical pressrireit declared a
moratorium on someof the linkage indevelopmentbUdget loans to
agricultural andindustrialproducersand allowedtherecipients of
mortgages financedfrom state funds to optretroactively for linkage tothe
Consumer PriceIndex. It could not,however, default on its owndollar-
linkedobligations. Notsurprisingly, therefore, thegovernment discon-
tinued issuing suchobligations andcurtailed the granting ofdollar-linked
credits, most of itslending and all of itsborrowing being henceforthinked
to the CPI. Someexchange rate linkagesurvived, however, ingovernment
loans to exportindustries and in transactionsbetween privateindividuals.
The internal pricestability whichcharacterized the late 19605seeniS to
have misled thegovernment into thinkingthat it would carry overto the
next decade aswell. In late 1967 itoffered to forgo thelinkage clauses in
most of its existinglinked credits for a"linkage insurance"premium of four
percent per annum. Asimilar premium hadbeen introduced sometime
Lfore to insure firmsborrowing abroad againstthe risk of changesin the
official exchange rate ofthe IL.Its extension to coverindexation risks as
well created a curious situation,for the prenhiLiilifell short of thepublic's
expected rate of inflation.Consequently, almost allof the internalmedium-
and long-term public debtin Israelis linked, while alarge part ofthe
government's outstandingcredit is not. Withthe renewalof inflationarY
pressures in 1971,and particularly their verrapid accelerationafter the
1973 war, the governmentfound itself badlypressed by thisasymmetry. As
a result, various governmentdepartments andagencies raisedthe contlict
ing demands of reintroducinglinkage on statecredits and taxingthe
public's indexation profits on stateloans.'
The last development whichshould be mentionedhere is theabolition,
in 1970, of the old Turkish lawwhich imposed aceiling on interestrates.
In view Of the great uncertaintyregarding pricedeveloPn1e0tin the more
distant future, the nominal interestrate couldnot substitutefor indexation
in long-term credit, bitt freeingit probablychecked thespread of indexa-
tion to short-term transactions.*
Indexation of Wages
The wage indexation nhairisininisraelis tormally bed d
riorlica I ly renewable agreementbetween the centrzr trade orion Organiia
tion (H istadrut> and theManutaCturers Association ot Israel. But both
H istadrut-owned enterprisesand the governmenttile two biggest single
employers in the countryadhere toitautoniaticaII', and other flonsig-
natories can be forced tocomply.8Its coverage has been gradijaI!
broadened, so that by 1 963 it wasestimated to apply to about 85 percent
of all employees.9 By now, theonly groups riot covered are such marginal
ones as domestichelp, seasonal agricultural labor, etc.
These agreements provide for the paymentof a proportionate cost-of-
living allowance (COLA) wheneverthe rise in the consumer price index
(CPI) exceeds a certain (cumulative)threshold. Initially, the allowance
could be adjusted every three months. But overthe years its frequency has
been reduced to twice a year, in Januaryand in July, except for periods of
very rapid price increases.such as may follow a devaluation. The allowance
is paid only on that part of an employee's earningswhich does not exceed
a certain ceiling. Whik thisceiling has been periodically upgraded to keep
pace with both inflation and the rise inreal incomes, its adjustment has
been far from automatic. Consequently, the share of the total wage bill on
which COLA was paid has varied between one adjustment of the ceiling
and the next one)°
Originally, the COLA was calculated on the basis of the change in the
CPI rluring the period since the last adjustment was made. This, however,
as well as the method used to calculate the CPI in the 1 950s, made it worth
while for the government to manipulate the CPI for purposes of COLA.
Because of the threshold condition, it also made the adjustment of the
allowance highly sensitive to short-term price variations. The calculation
was therefore changed to a comparison of the average price level in the
period which elapsed since the last adjustment was made to the average
for the preceding Period of the same length. Also, the most seasonally
volatile component of the CPI, the price o1 fruits and vegetables,is
included in the computation only once a year, and the price averages are
annual ones, even when all other prices are compared on a six-month
basis. Another, more sophisticated, correction has been the exclusion of
changes in the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing, on the grounds
that they constitute a self-balancing increaseri both income arid consunip-
tion expenditure.
Regarded at its inception as something of a social security measure, the
allowance has been tax-free until now)It thus increased the government's
wage-bill without providing a parallel source of tax revenue. In the earlie




on thebasis of whichthe COLA was calculated. Itshould IN' StreSS('(I here
thatitne\'eitoe-cl to tafllper withhe index itselfButii the 1 95 Os the
weights of theindex, SUppOSedlY representingthe bundle of goods pur-
chased by an averageurban wage earner's household, were notadjusted
often enough toallov for changes in actual COflSUI1)ptiOnpatterns; price
data werecollected on certain specificdates, and, as mentioned above, the
allowanceitselt was calculatedaccording to the change in the index
between twopoints in time.All this made it easy tor the government to, in
effect, manipulatethe index through short-termsubsidies on overrep-
resented items.2 Since1959, however, the frequentupdating of the index
weights, the collectionof price information on a continuousbasis, and the
use ofsix-month, or even longer,price-level averages in calculating COLA
made such manipulation nolonger worthwhile.' The calculationof the
CPI, which is usedalso for most other indexation purposesinIsrael, is
performed by theCentral Bureau of Statistics, a governmentagency the
integrity of whoseprocedure is guaranteed partly bylaw and partly by a
system of publicadvisory committees. Theindex is published monthly,
with a fortnight's lag,becoming available on the 15th of the month (or the
next day it this happens tofall on a Saturday) following the oneto which it
pertains.
For many years the governmenttook no part in the periodcrenegotia-
tions of the COLA agreenlent,though it adhered 10 itvoluntarily as an
employer. Since 1970. however,it has been taking anactive part in them,
regarding the allowance as partof the general incomespolicy. As this
policy tended to take the formof tripartite agreementsbetween govern-
ment, employers, and unionsregarding the simultaneousdetermination ol
wages, prices, and taxes,the COLA became lessautomatic; morerecently,
however, all three parties haveagreed to restore its automaticcharacter, at
the same time restricting the proportionof the price increasecompensated
tom. Some of the new, sofar untested, arrangementsare describedin
Section III below, in the comparisonof the Brazilian andIsraeli systems of
wage indexation.
Financial Assets
The government's domination oi theIsraeli capital market canbe ascribed
partly to necessity and partly to ideology.The investmentfunds required by
the doubling of the population within the
three years of massimmigration,
1949-1951, could not be mobilizedwithin the econonlY.Private invest-
ments from abroad were notfohcoming in sufficientvolume, so practi-
cally all of capital formation was financedin those earlyyears by theaid
and loans the government succeeded inobtaining fromabroad. WhileS
most investment tunds were thus rei.:eived by the govemnlentitVas Iio
unahle and, in VieW 01 its commitment to a miXed erunnmy unwilli8
to
undertake the actualinvestnieiitprocess.Inlending thesefurXjs to
semipublic agencies and pris/ate enterprises, it performed the1tion of
the then almost nonexistent capital riiarkel. In later Y(l1S private
Capital
imports and domestic savings came to play an increasingly iniportant
role
in investment financing. The government did not, however, curtail its
role
as the main financial intermediary in the country, partly owing to its wish
to control the industrial arid regional distr!hution of economic activity
Originally, the funds obtained through aid or throughgovernmebor-
rowing abroad were channelled through the development budget.With the
increasing availability of doniestic financing, much of bothgovernn0
borrowing and lending operations have been shifted to banks andother
financial institutions, some state-owned and some I)riVate. These
issue
long-terni bonds to the public and lend the proceeds according totreasury
instructions. The government's power to allocate these fundsconies ulti-
mately from its willingness to subsidize the cost of capital to theinvestor
The government even subsidizes the capital cost ofsome enterprises,
mainly state- or Histadrut-owned, which themselves issue bondsto linance
their own investment projects. Fornially, the proceeds of suchissues are
deposited with the treasury, who then lends them to the bondissuer, to
used for the purposes and on the ternis specified byit.For all practical
purposes they are indistinguishable from bonds issued directly bythe
government.'4
With the exception of the Short-Term (up to eighteenmonths) Loan,
government or government-sponsored bonds are issued for periodsof four
to ten years, and their principal, and often also theirinterest, is index-
inked. The index used is the CPI, theone which serves as the base for the
COLA computation. However, unlike the lattercase, the monetary correc-
tion on index bonds is proportionateto the increase in the price level from
the month preceding issueto the month preceding redemption (orpayment
of interest), and noton longer period averages; also, the CPI isnot adjusted
for either seasonal fluctuationsor changes in the prices of owner-occupied
housing. Whilesome of the bonds pay interest twice yearly, inothers it is
cumulated up to maturity. Onei)ecu liar variant is a bond that allows its
holder to optretroactively for either index linkageor the alternative higher
nominal interest rate. Theseare the results of a period in the 1 960s when
expectations of price stability madethe regular linked bonds unattractive
compared with the Short-TermLoan, which is unlinked butpays a higher
nominal interest rate. Themonetary correction, or,as it is called in Israel,
the indexation differential,on the principal of these bonds is not taxable
and they enjoy the privilegeof a flat-rate taxon the interest, deducted at
the source.'5 In addition,there exist also long-terninonnegotiable bonds
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seventeen totWCiltV years) issued extlusively to provident ILinds and
insurance C0111Pa11iC5.
In 1974bonds amounted to 85 percentof the total market value of
securitiesregistered at the Tel Aviv stockexchange. Of this, nearly nine-
tenths wasaccounted for by in(IeXedl)OldS, and a further 8 percent by
those linked to ortraded in foreign currency The tiny remainderconsisted
almost exclusivelyof bonds convertible into shares at somelater date.
Other indexedfinancial assets available to the public are savingsde-
posits, life insurancepolicies, and savings accumulated in providentfunds
and pension plans.Inclexation applies also to compulsoryloan certificates.
While sonic of these arenonnegotiable, they can substitute for other forms
of savings withinthe individual's portfolio.Demand and ordinary time
deposits, as well as theShort-Term Loan, are urrindexed.
indexed liabilities of thepublic, owed to the government and thebank-
ing system, by nowconsist almost exclusively of soniccategories of hous-
ing mortgages. Sincethe abolition of linkage ondevelopment loans, de-
scribed earlier, most of thegovernment's outstanding credit is nolonger
indexed. The short-term creditsupplied by the banking system isalso
unindexed.
Itis difficult to ascertain theprevalence of indexation in theprivate
sector of the economy,other than in its transactionswith the government
or with the banking sector.Both exchange rate and indexlinkage were
fairly common in the direct billbrokerage market.But since the abolition
of the usury law in 1970 (and thetightening of regulationsregarding the
volume of brokerage a bank mayguarantee) this market is nolonger
significant.
In concluding this survey of the variousforms of debt linkagepracticed
in Israel, mention should be madeof another type of assetregarded in Israel
as linkedforeign exchangedeposits. With certainexceptions, exchange
control regulations make itillegal for Israeliresidents to hold loreign
currencies or securities. However, toprovide incentives forexchange
transfers despite the overvaluatiori ofthe IL, the recipientsof foreign
currency (mainly private restitutionpayments fromthe GermanFederal
Republic) are allowed to hold a certainfraction of itin special time
deposits. These funds can be used fortheir owners' personalneed's, such as
travel abroad, or for the purchase of foreign
securities which canthen be
sold to other Israeli residents. The rest canbe held in anothertype of time
deposit, nominally valued in foreign exchange,but redeemableonly in
local currency. Thus, these deposits ate ineffect exchaflgelied. In their
speculative function they are very similar to
straightforward foreign cur-
rency holdings in countries with noexchange controls;however, in the
Israeli case the sale of foreign currency tothe centralbank precedes its
actual conversion into the local one.I
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Taxes
Though it accepted indexation in the labor market and
iI)tru(i1J(ecl tinthe capital market, until 1 975 the Israeli governmentwas riot Prepared
to see1 extended toits own revenues.Itsonly, reluctant,COPCCSSi00 in th5
direction has been the exemption from personal incometax of theCOLA The position of self-employed taxpayerswas equalized with thatof em- ployees by linking the minimum incomeexempt from taxationto the COLA. But income tax brackets were not adjusted
auton1aticaIl, with inflation; revaluation of deprecial)le assetswas inhibjtd by theCapita! gains tax and by the tax levied on real estate and businessinventoriand LIFO valuation of the latter was not allowed fortax Purposes.Instead the government relied on occasional and unsystematictax revisionsas well as
a whole series of specific devices that went a longway to Ufldrniining
the whole tax system.
Under the highly progressive personalinconl(' tax schedules
infiatiop rapidly increased the tax burden imposedon a given real incomelo a certain extent, the rapid growth of realincomes in Israel helped to
alleviate this effect. Nevertheless, thetax base came to be more andmore eroded h tax concessions on various types of inconle:overtime income andproduc- tivity bonuses, profits from "approved"investnients in industry,interest on government bondsall became subjectto flat, nonprogressivetax rates. As moore and more taxpayers became liableto the highest marginaltax rate (which, together with thecompulsory loan, recentlyreached 87percent) an increasing share of profitscame to be taken in tax-deductible
expense accounts and an increasing shareot wages came to be paidin the form of untaxed expense reimbursements.The valuation ofdepreciable assets at their historicalcost of purchase creates illusorybut neverthelesstaxable profits. Rather than allowtheir continuousrevaluation, the internalrevenue authorities allowed themto be depreciated fortax purposes at rates farin excess of those correspondingto the length of theireconomic life. In one case, that of long-held realestate, the land bettermenttax on the difference between sale andpurchase priceswhichincludes a considerable infla- tionary profitwasreduced by a rebateproportionate to the number of years between thetransactions,
While thesenleasures helped to offsetsome of the negative allocation
and distribution effectsof inflation undera nominal tax systeni, they could not do away with allof theni, and theythemselves introducedsome additional ones. Sincethey were not directlyrelated to the rate of inflation, their impact alsovaried fromone year to anotherFurthermore through a peculiar neglect, thegovernnlent imposed onlya nominal interest on lax arrears, thus creatingan incentive, especiallyfor corporations and the self-employed,not to pay theirtaxes on time.
The 1975 taxreform introducedthe iridexation ofincome tax bracketsS
Correction andInclexation
eta1Y
and of thesystem of taxcredits and allowances, in the future these are to
revised as often asquarterIyin line with the COLA. The reform also
limited thecapital gains tax tothe index-deflated gain (but added a 10
percent tax onits inflationaryelement) and imposed CPI linkage on tax
arrears.This newlegislationhowever, has yet to be tested in practice.
Furtherm0, itstill does not allowfor continuous revaluation of deprecia-
ble assets, nordoes it recognize LIFOvaluation of inventories. While there
seems tobe some intentionof applying the indexation principle to some
other taxes aswell, such as the estate duty,this has flot been done so far.
[Ill]COMPARISON ANDEVALUATION
Wages
As was pointedout in several ofthe papers submitted at this conference,
there is no true"indexation of wages in Brazil)7It may be argued that to
some extentthis is because theformula relating nominal wages to the price
level constitutes aninstrument of governmentpolicy and not an automatic
contractual mechanism. But evenin Israel, where the COLA systemmuch
more nearlyapproaches true indexation, theHistadrut has nevertheless
been known on occasionto forgo the allowancewhen it considered its
payment to be againstthe interest of the workers orthe national economy.
It is the frequencyand arbitrariness of discretionaryaction, however, which
seem to justify theview that the mechanismoperating in Brazil would be
more correctlydescribed as incomes-poliCYguidelines. This was certainly
true of the situationbefore 1 968, when the wageformula allowed only for
expected inflation, but not forthat actually experiencedin the past. In
addition to the discretionary elementand the narrownessof coverage, the
present Brazilian wageindexation system differsfrom the Israeli also inthe
following respects:
The wage base to which monetary
correction is applied,and the
inclusion of productivity changesin the wageformula.
The length of the time lagwith which the correction
imade.
The inclusion in the Brazilian systemof the expected rateof infla-
tion.
The proportion of price levelchanges forwhich wage earners are
automatically compensated throughthe system.
The first of these four differences is
illustrative of themain problemof
wage indexation. As stressed inSection Iof this paper,indexatiOn can
substitute for only that part of themarket mechanismwhich adjusts
nominal wages to changes in the pricelevel. Othermechanisms arestill
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required to regulate the general level of the realwage nd thereJIti\e wages of different industries and ocCupational groups. In
Israel, these mechanisms arc the same as those that wouldoperate in the absenceof inflation: a centralized collective bargainingprOCess, which deternijnes
the percentage increase in the real wage (on which theCOLA will laterbe paid), and changes in individuals' wages through"wage drift." By
contrast the Brazilian wage formula is burdened withthe two completelydifferent tasks performed inIsrael by the COLA systemon the one han(lan(i collective bargaining on the other,It may, of course, be
questioned whether a complete separation of the variouslabor marketmechanisnis is, in fact, possible. In particular, it has beenargued that inflationary
expecta. tions are invariably taken intoaccount in collective bargaining
indepen. dent of any COLAarrangements. Pure automatic indexationso runs this argument, must thus cause wageearners to beovercompensated for inflation. With resLiltant wage-push effects.
The Israeli experience doesnot validate this argument.In a study of
quarterly rates of change in theyears 1955 to 1965, changesin the price level were found to affectnominal wages only indirectly,via the COLA. This should not, however, beinterpreted to mean that thereis no substitu- tion between the variousmechanisms: the nominalwage was found torise by the full COLA, despite thefact that the latter doesnot cover the whole wagehill.18
Whetherovercompensation will occur may dependalso on the lengthof the time lag involved inthe operation of theindexation mechanism.The two commissions wichwere at different times askedto suggest improve ments in the CO'A system inIsrael both came out infavor of makingthe interval between COLAadjustments as shortas technically feasible, forthis would reduce thepressure for immediate, andultimately excessive,com- pensation through parallelimechanisms. The lag withwhich past inflation is accounted forin the nominalwage is much longer inBrazil than in Israel, because of boththe lower frequencyof adjustment andthe longer lag in theavailability of the relevantprice indexes.19 In viewof the high rates of inflation in Brazil,the long lag withwhich indexationoperates through the wageformula might beexpecti to providemore opportuni' forovercompensation Yet thequestion whether realwages have risen or fallen is the subjectof controversy inBrazil despite thevery rapid growth of GNP per capitain recentyears, suggesting that suchoverconipencatjon (lid not, infact, occur.2°





perform anyof the Itinctionsof indexjtiori proper. But (Oml)iflpçwith
.postindexation,it may improvethe working of the latter. As the
8dtuStment
Of wages tothe price level cannotbe instantaneous, a tempo-
rarydecrease inreal wages,unwarranted by any realphenomena will
occurbetweensuccessivereadjusiments of the nominal iage.The inclu
on of anelement ofexpected inflation 10the nominal Wage may thus he
regarded as anadvance payment onaccount of indexationdifferentials due
in thefuture. Theratio ofpast-experienced to past-expectedinflation rates
incorporated inthe recentBrazilian formula thus representsthe final
settlement ofthe monetarycorrection account.The need for suchadvance
paymentsbecomes moreacute the higherthe inflation rate, the morerapid
its acceleration,and the longerthe intervals atwhich the indexationclause
operates.Their absencefrom the COLA Systemmay be explainedby the
fact that theadjustment periods areshorter and theinflation rates on the
whole lower inIsrael than inBraziL Furthermore,for the last twodecades
real wages inIsrael have beenrising at a fairlysteady rate of 5 percent per
annum. In mostof those years,the Israeli workercould therefore expect
that his real incomewould not fallbelow that receivedin the preceding
year evenif COLA payments weredelayed (thoughthen it would belower
than what thecollective wage agreenients
had intended him toreceive in
the absence ofinflation). Even so, on oneor twooccasions wheninflation
suddenly accelerated,the Histadrutdemanded, and received,an advance
on the newCOLA, at leastfor low wage earners.
The Brazilian systemdoes not allowfor full monetarycorrection: only
half the inflation rate,whether expected oractually experienced,enters the
wage formula.2'The rationaleunderlying thisprocedure, asmentioned
earlier, is that of restraininginflation through areduction in thereal wage.27
However, the Israeliexperiencedemonstrates thatsuch imperfectcorrec-
lion may under certaincircumstances bequite consistentwith "true"
indexation. Generallyspeaking, thiswill happenwhen the risein the price
level represents an exogenousfall in the realincome ofthe privatesector.
A deterioration in the termsof tradethrough anincrease inthe Priceof
imports, say, in oil prices,is a case inpoint. Theadjustment ofnominal
wages to the full extentof the resultingrise in thedomestic priceindex is
then equivalent to an attempt onbehalf of theemployees toshift thewhole
of the unavoidable decreasein real incomeonto theemployers. Thesame
will be true of price increasesdue to changesin the rateof exchange,in
import tariffs, and, to a lesserextent, inindirect taxationin general.These
are all cases where, asmentioned inthe introduction,
full indexation
cannot simultaneously restorethe status quoin bothreal incomesand
income distribution.
The treatment of price risesoriginating from
outsi(le theprivate sector,156
Ephrn
particulady fromoutside the nationaleconomy, has bee,i thesubet much discussion inisrael, where imports ofgoods andsrvi( amounted to between one-third andone-half of GOPWhile defensedfl( investment requirements, togetherwith inputs forexport prOj(j(t0fl
d( - count for most of total imports, the import
component direct unidindirer t, in pnivate consumptionamounts to over 20percentUnder thefij exchange rate regime, theinfrequent massivedevakjatiorsUsed to be almost immediately transmittedinto the cost-of.iivingindex Theprol)Iem could, in principle, be solvedby computing theCOLA on thbasis ofan index of domestic prices only.'4But the constructiornof suchan index especially one that could becalculated nionthlywithout much(lelay proved to be impracticable.Consequently, the (usuallypartial) exctusiof devaluation effects from COLAcomputations used to hethe sub;etof ad-hoc negotiations,as when, on one of theoccasions referredto earlier, the l-listadrut agreedto forgo the allowancedue to theimpositionof a general import levy in thesummer of 1970.
The transition toa system of nhinidevaluatjonsin1 975 made itimpossi ble to resort to ad-hocnegotiations any longer.Consequently theCOLA agreement has been revisedso that in the futurethe allowancewill compensate for only 70percent of the increase inthe CPI. Sucha l)artia compensation cannot he easilyjustified in thecase of Brazil wheretotal imports amount tono more than between7 and 10percent of GDP. It would, however, berequired in the high-trades
West Europeancoon. tries, though notin the UnitedStates.25
Another argument,raised both in Braziland in Israel,in favor of less than fullwage indexation refersto the inability ofindustries theprices of which lag behindthe rest,particularly exportindustriesto raise nominal wages in proportion to theprice level.26 Thestructural changesreflected in such divergentdevelopment ofindividual pricesmay actually requirethe average real wage tofailfor example,when the demandfor theoutput of labor-intensiveindustries hasgrown relativelyless than therest. The downward stickinessof wages couldthenprevent the rnechanisnentrusted with determiningthe realwage from downward
adjustment tocompensate for theoperation of a fullindexation system,It is worth notingthat in 1966 the HistadrutinIsrael forwer)ta COLApayment in view of thethen Prevailingemployment situation,a contrjbutocause of which had been the wageincreases obtainedthrough collectivewage agreements. But except in sucha case, price divergences






indefenton equiP.' groundsich,uhsidi iitiot1 rant tot he ('ft('(t('d
unless laborn exporti ndustn esc hihiv specilic. with noalternat V1
emp10Yfht inthe rest ofthe econOtllY.
Financial Assets
The sumtotal ofindexed instrumentsissued by the treasury and the
financial systemin BraziORT, housing bonds,and indexed saving
deSiSam0uted toCr$ 41,583 millionby the end of973. This was
equivalent tosorfleVt'1t less thanhail the money supply,and somewhat
less thanone-tenth of GDP.The comparable figurefor lsrael_onsistingof
saving depositsand the valueof all indexed governmefltbondswas IL
35,695 million,the equivalentof nearly five timesthe money supply and
as much asnine-tenths of GDP.27These ratios are notstrictly comparable,
of course becauseof institutionaland other differencesbetween the two
countries. These,however, do notall operate in onedirection. Thus, for
example, Braziliancommercial banks canhold part of theircornpulsor
reserves inadjustable treasurybonds (ORTNs),while Israeli banks can-
not.2 On the otherhand, the social securitysystem is a malorholder of
indexbonds in Israel. but notin Brazil.Nevertheless, it seems tohe a
safe conclusion thatindexed financialinstrumentS play,quantitatiY a
much greater role inIsrael's economy thanin BraLil'SJ"
The figures quoted aboveoverstate the importanceof inrlexedinstru-
ments to the generalpublic. In both countriesaconsiderable portionot
indexed government bonds isused to effecttransfers betweenthe treasury
and various government agencies, orbetween themonetaryauthorities and
the banking system. Itis worth notingthat of the Cr$21,000 millionof
ORTNs outstanding by theend of 1973,only about 18percent couldbe
regarded as held by the generalpublic. Andin Israelthe holdingsof
National Insurance Institute aloneaccounted fornearly a quarterof all
indexed bonds outstanding.3°
Table 1 provides data on theportfolio ofliquid assetsheld by thegeneral
public in both countries. To make itpossible to draw
conclusions as tothe
relative importance of indexed assesdespitedifficulties ofcomparab
we present two alternative seof data foreach of the twocountries. In
both cases alternative B gives a higherestimate otthe shareof indexedI
assets in the public portfolio thandoes alternativeA: inBraLil, byexclud
ing acceptances from the nonindexedcategoly; inIsrael, byincluding
compulsory loans in the indexed one.Furthermo.the estinlatesare also
biased so as to reduce the differencesri theproporti0flof indexed to
nonindexed assets held. In particularexchangerateIinkl
deposits and



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total 0.39 0.32 0.60 0.79
Nonrndexed 0.34 0.27 0.30 0.30
Monetary 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19
indexed 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.49
Bonds 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.40
Total excluding indexed bonds 0.37 0.30 0.39 0.39
MonetaryCOrreCt10f..!id Indexation
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israel, although theirrelative volume probablyOutstrips the similarly
excluded holdings offoreign currencies in Brazil)'
The data in Table 1demonstrate that though thedifferences j- the role
which indexed assetsplayed in the financial asset potlfolioof the public in
the two countries weresmaller than suggested by theconsideration of their
total, gross volume,they were nevertheless significant.Indexedassets
amounted to between 50and 60 percent of the portfolio heldby the public
in Israel but toonly between 10 and 20 percent of the Brazilian portfolio.
The most strikingdifference is in the relative importance of indexedbonds.
These amounted to no morethan 7 percent of the portfolio in Brazilbut to
more thanone-third in Israel, and to as much as one-half if compulsory
loans are included.32
Associated with the difference in the Structure of the public's portfolio of
liquid assets are thoseiiiitssize.In Tab!e 2,the main magnitudes
presented above are expressed as ratios to GDP. itis evident that the
relative size of the public's total holdings of the assets considered here was
smallerriBrazil than inIsrael.Part of the difference can probably be
ascribed to the higher per capita income of the latter.Operating in the
opposite direction, however, should be the greater absolute economic size
of Brazil and the presumably greater inequality of incomes there, Indeed,
Table 2 shows that the ratio of money balances to income was roughly the
same in both countries, and, if anything, slightly higher in Brazil. Practi-
calithe whole difference in the overall ratio of liquid assets to income is
due to differences in holdings of indexed assets, primarily of indexed
bonds. With the latter excluded, the ratio of the remaining assets to GDP is
on the same order of magnitude in the two countries: 0.39 in Israel as
against 0.30-0.37, depending on the definition used, in Brazil.34
The size, relative to GDP, of the public's portfolio of liquid assets may be
TABLE 2Ratio of Selected Liquid Assets Held by the Public
Relative to GDP, Brazil and Israel: 1973Ephrairn Kleirrian
regarded as an indicator of the financial system's capability to intermediate
in the capital market,Inn p led with the genera iy miic h chorter term
structure of the unindexed financial instruments, the figures of Table 2
suggest that indexed assets, and indexed bOndS Ifl particular, played an
important role in capital accumulation in Israel, bit almost none in Brazil,
The remarkable difference between the proportion of indexed assets in
the liquid portfolios held by the public in the two countries israther
surprising, for Brazil has a long history of sustained inflation atrates
considerably exceeding those experienced by Israel before 1973)6 Admit-
tedly, in that year the 20 percent rate of inflation in Israel exceeded the16
percent reported for Brazil.3 And with inflation rising to 40 percent in
1974, the public reacted by raising the share of indexed assets from 50to
60 percent of its liquid holdings. But already in 1972, with an inflation rate
of only 13 percent, this share amounted to 38 percentmore than twiceas
much as in Brazil. In contrast to the experience in Israel, the Brazilian
share does not seem to be correlated with inflation, rising by two discrete
steps from about 6 percent in 1966-1967 to 17 percent in 1970-i 9733s
Part of the difference in the propensity to hold indexed assets may be due
to the difference in expectations. In Israel, the last Iew years referredto
here were a time of rapidly accelerating inflation. In Brazil,on the other
hand, inflation has been decelerating since the mid-i 960s. ButI would
also venture the opinion that at least some of the difference must be dueto
imperfections in indexation practices in Brazil, on theone hand, and the
greater adjustability of nominal interest rates there, on the other.As a
result, tile attractiveness of indexed bonds (and deposits) relativeto unin-
dexed financial assets is smaller in Brazil than inIsrael.
Broadly speaking, the Brazilian and Israeli bond indexationpractices
differ with respect to the price index used, the method of calculatingthe
monetary correction, and the frequency of its payment. No single index
can be claimed to be the'correct" one for allndexation purposes,
especially if we consider linkage within the privatesector as well, and the
linkageof transactions referring to the future purchase ofa specific
commodity (e.g., housing) in particular. Insofaras the public debt is
concerned, however, equity and policy considerations haveto be taken
into account. That the CPI (the index used alsoin wage linkage) was
adopted for this purpose inIsrael can be ascribed to the equity consid-
eration, as well as to the fact thatit was readily available when the
indexation of debt instrumentswas first introduced. However, unlike the
COLA calculation, bond linkage is one-hundredpercent mechanical, being
subject to neither seasonalor other adjustments nor ln'' ad-hoc interven-
tions. With the acceleration of inflation in thelast ICW years, and particu-
larly since the partial exclusion ofdevaluation effects on the CPI from the
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UOIW)PUI  pu  iO)  MMJ0W which preceded the actua time oliirchae. Flie divergence Ex'twe('ilthe
two cannot he of much importance when the relevant periodsare very
short.ButinBrazilthe price levels used to calculate themonetary
correction are three-month averages, aridare available with a delay of two
montlls.41 in Israel, theseare monthly averages and the delay is onlytwo
weeks. Nevertheless, even there, theoccurrence of sudden, considerable
price rises makes it possI)le for the lender to link his capital toa lower
index base than actually prevailed at tile time.42
Adjustable treasury bonds (ORTNs)are issued in Brazil for periods of two
to five years, and there was evenan attempt to issue One-year bonds. In
Israel, indexed bonds areissued only for periods of fouryears and
upwards. Basically, the difference isthat of the frequency withwhich
monetary correctionis pad out. At one extreme, one coulrl thinkof
monetary correction being paid currently, together with,say, a twice-
annual interest payment; at tile other, of it beingcumulated up to matu-
rity.43 The first corresponds to the view which regardsnlonetary correction
as a way of calculating the correct nonuinal rate of interest;tile second, to
that which regards itas a way of preserving the real value of theprincipal.
\A'ith perfect capital markets, thetwo systems affect tile individual's wealth
in the same way.44 Buteven then, their monetary effects are different.
Unless the public is ready to reinvest periodically thesame real amount in
government bonds, reliance on short-term indexed loanswill result in price
increases being, at least in part, accommodatedwithin a short time by the
monetary expansion required topay the monetary correction. A highly
concentrated term structjre oa long-run indexed debt contracted inan
inflationary period, on the other hand,may result in long cyclical swings of
nlOnetary expansion. But the effect of suchcycles will probably be offset
by the growth of real income.
The difference between theterm structures of the indexed debtin the
two countries could possibly he attributedto the rate of inflation being in
the long run much higher inBrazil than in Israel.Itis, therefore, worth
mentioning that with the recentacceleration of inflation in Israel thepublic
came to regard bonds with short maturityas a close substitute for monetary
assets. Consequently, considerablesupport has been gained for the view
that indexation should beconfined to long-term bonds,or if possible,
granted only to their long-termholders.
A peculiar problem which shouldbe mentioned here is that of"indexa- tionin one country." Undera constant-exchange rateregimeitcan become extremely profitablefor foreigners topurchase the bonds of an
indexed country__provided theymanage to repatriate their capitalbefore the exchange rateiseventually adjusted in thewake of inflationary
pressures. The indexing countrycan thus find itself borrowing fromabroad at effective interest ratesconsiderably exceeding thoseprevailing there. In
a
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UOI  1PX3PUI  pue  UO!1J3JJ0J  9  I tion is the borrowers fear that the price of hisown reven uc-prodticirig
goods will rise more slowly than the general price level(,ind that the lag
will increase with inflation). This argument implies that the Iiigher th0 rate
of inflation, the more relative prices are expected tOvary. I3ut when, ina
preliminary exaniination, the relative annual dispersionin the prices often
nIain CII groups was regressed on the annual rate of inflation,th0 result for
Brazil, for 1962 -1970,was
= 0.09 + 4.60x R2= 0.573
1)21 I.M)
and that for Israel, for l956-172,was
0.37 + i .25x -' = 0.653 lii
where .x denotes the generalprice increase and the small numeralsare the
standard errors of the coefficients.1
Further investigation ofmore highly disaggregated data mayreverse this
finding that relativeprice dispersion decreases with inflation; furthermore
the fear of directgovernment interference in the pricingprocess rilay have
played a greater role in individualprice expectations than pastexperience
of broad price aggregates. In bothBrazil arid Israel, inflationwas accom-
panied by attempts to ''Suppress" inflationeither by direct price Controlsor bypressure-backedpersuasion. And eveninmore market-oriented
econlonlies, itis precisely the big, multiproductcorporation able to com-
mand a market for its indexedbonds which will also be theobject of
government price-freezing 'guidelines."But in any event, in both Brazil
and Israel, the abstention of firmsfrom issuing indexed obligations(other than against holdings ofindexed government bonds) isprobably due
primarily to the governmentdomination of the capital markets. Theavail- ability of cheap unlinkeddevelopment loans, on tileone hand, and tax
concessions on government bonds,on the other, made private long-term
borrowing bothunnecessary and excessively expensive.
Taxes
In the first part of thispaper indexation was definedas the more or less
automatic adjustment of nominalvalues to changes in theprice level. In the case of taxes thismeans preventing inflation fromchanging tile tax burden imposedon a given real value. In practicalterms,itrequires deflating by the priceindex all revenues andproperty values subject to a flat tax rate and theincome brackets to whichgiven rates of a progressive tax apply. The former has,infact, been done inBrazil, by allowing































revaluatiOn has beenallowed on oniy a lewoccasions, usually
in thewake of big, discreteexchange rtt devaluations Asa Substitute tor
0ntnuoijsadjustinei1tthe government, as we have seen iii the preceding
c,ectiofl,relied on various oflsetting measures, such as tax COnceSSions ind
quick depreciatbotlwrite-offs.
While indexatiofl 01income brackets tor income tax purposes was not
practiced in Israeluntil recently, itis thought to have been applied by the
BraLilan tax authorities.This impression, however, seenis to be clue in part
to the term asinterpreted in Brazil, which differs from the one underly-
ing the presentdiscussion. There, indexation has come to mean any
adjustment whichtakes into account changes in the general price level.
Thus, the developmentof the price index is considered for the purpose of
income bracketrevaluations. But they do not seem to he carried out
automatically according to agenerally available set of rules.1
The Israeli government'slong-standing refusal to index taxes may be
explained in part by the lowerinflation rates experienced in Israel. For a
long time, the rapid growthof real incomes, on the one hand, and the
various partial remedies applied, onthe other, mitigated the erosion of the
tax system by inflation. But overand above the conditions which facilitated
t, the government's behavior wasalso determined by considerations of
economic management and equity. 'Fiscaldrag" has long been believed
to be an important automaticstabilizer.Itis generally conceded that
inflationary pressures in Israel were, in mostperiods, generated by the
expansion of the public sector. Coupled with easy moneypolicies aimed at
encouraging growth, this left the revenue side of thebudget as the main, if
not the only, instrument of combating inflation.The 'naturaI" elasticity of
progressive taxation with respect to inflation wasthus regarded as an
alternative to raising the tax rates themselves. That the two werenot perfect
substitutes is evident from the other beneficial rolewhich tax authorities
ascribed to inflation: that of reducing income inequality.
In fact, neither object was ac:omplishc-d to anysatisfactory degree.
Because the marginal inconie tax rate is subject to an upperlimit, inflation
resulted in narrowing the real income range towhich tax progression
applied, moving an increasing number of taxpayers intothe range of the
constant marginal rate. Thus, inflation had the effectof reducing inequality
only within the low- and medium-income groups. Furthermore,
with very
high tax rates applying to successively lower real incomes,tax loopholing
and avoidance (of the types mentioned in the preceding
section) canie to
assume ever-growing proportions. This alsogrossly reduced anyanti-
inflationary effects the fiscal drag might in principlehave had.
The Israeli experience in the absence of tax indexation,
as well asthe
fact that Brazil had to introduce some nieaSUre oI it (asdid Israel, eventu-





on the revenue side.It seems that neither incomeequalization noran increase in the real tax burdencan be achieved by default toany cignifj cant degree, Inflation-inducedmovements in these diretiuiismay be pos-
sible as long as they are small andtherefore of little importanceBut under rapid inflation, the magnitudes theyassume in themselves prevejitthem from being fulfilled. The Israeligovernment was able to enjoy thestabiliz- ing effects of an unindexedtax system only because (and onlyas tong as) inflation was rather mild. InBrazil, where the high inflationrates made such stabilizers muchmore desirable, they had to beabandonedby allowing some degree oftax indexationfor precisely thesame reason for which they were required. Ifone of the arguments against indexatioriis the reduction of automatic fiscalstabilization, it seems to bemuch weakened by the present evidence.
In one rather importantrespect, especially in developingcountries tax linkage can provide thestabilizing effect supposedly lostthrough indexa tion. The reference isto tax arrears. The niore rapidthe decline in the purchasing power ofmoney, the greater the incentiveto delay taxpay- ments, even if arrearsare subject to some nominal interest.Besides its fiscal destabilizing effect,the accumulation of unlinkedtax debt also affects Income distribution,for employeescan exploit it to a much lesser
degree thancan the self-employed andcorporations, Both the Israeliex- perience and that of Brazilbefore the indexation oftax arrears was intro- duced underline theiniportance of this phenomenon.
Finally, there is thequestion of how indexation affectsthe tax aspect of inflation itself. By reducingthe real value of thegovernment's and the monetary authority's internaldebt, inflation transferspurchasing power from the private to thepublic sector.53 lithe publicdebt werecontracted exclusively in the financingof publicconsumption, the inflation taxwould be identical with thereduction in the real valueof the outstandingstock of unindexed outside-moneyand government bonds.However, the heavy
government involvement in the capitalmarket in both Braziland Israel means that the public sectoris a creditor, andnot only a debtor, of the private sector. It is thereforethe net internalposition of the publicsector which determines themagnitude, and even thesign, of the inflationtax. The evaluation ofthe government'sposition as creditorposes some difficulty, for in bothcountries much of its lendingis done throughagen. des and financialinstitutions enjoyingvarying degrees ofindependence In particular,itis practicallyimpossible to ascertain theextent to which government carries the lossescaused to banks andfinancial institutions by the nonindexatjonof loans grantedat its recommendation
The estimates of the inflation tax basepresented in Table 3are therefore only rough indi- cators. Nevertheless, theysuggest that, in bothcountries inflationcan no longer be regardedas an instrument for





















3a.Subtotal (1 through 3)
tess
Net nonindexed public
sector loans to the
private sectoC
Net (3a less 4)
Net as percent of GDP
fl,a.car
SOURCE:Brazil: Boletiin do Bancc' Cenir,iI rki Brasi(. Vol Xl (No. 12). Table2 (line 2); Bunco Central
do Brasil, Relarório Aiival t974, Tah!e 111.2line 1); Table 5/1.6 (line 3), arid Tables 11.6 and 111.7
(line 4).
Israel: Bank of israel, Aflriu3l Report 7q74, Table XV1-2 (line 1), Table XVII-4 (lInes 2 and 3),
and Tables XX-9 and XX-l0 (line 4); Stale Comptroller, Annual Report No. 25 (Hebrew), p. B8
(line 4).
'Brazil: Cash, noninde,ed deposits with the Bank of Brazil, special deposils with monetary authorities.
compulsory reserves other than ORTNs, and treasury bills )LTNs) held by private commercial banks.
Israel:liquid assets of commercial banks.
rBra23: LTNs held by the general public and by insurariccompanies and nsestment banks.
Israel' Outstanding government Short-Term Foan.
'Stazil: The balance of the Bank of Brazil's loans to lIe privale suitor, CiS 37,970 million, netof the
private oector's demand deposits with the Bank of Brazil (err )usive of banking institutions).
isuel: Long-term outstanding credit of the Ministry of Finance (II. 7.500 million) >055 loans to government
ogencies estimated at IL 1000 million), pius balance 01 ''directed'' credit in local currency granted outof
the esp'jrt credt fund, etc., and lhrough Bank of Israel recliscounts and liquidity exemptions.
private to the public sector. Because of institutional differences,the defini-
tions used to estimate net government credit are not the samefor the two
countries. For Brazil, this was defined as the differencebetween the Bank
of Brazil's loans to, and the deposits held with it by, the privatesector.
Thus estimated, the inflation tax l)JSP ariioufltS to no more thanbetween 1
and 2 percent of GDP. As this assumes all developrilentloans granted by
the National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE) to befully indexed,
it probably overstates the size of the tax base. Indeed, in adetailed study of
Brazil's inflation it was estimated that over 90 percentof the gross inflation
tax revenue in the period 1969-1972 was ultimatelyrebated to the private
Sector.54 For Israel, we took the balance of long-term
development loans
granted by the treasury and of the short-term creditlent by commercial
banks out of deposits held with them with this purpose bythe government



















































seen to have been ne'at,ve. In otherwords, inflation resulted ina transfer of resources away from thegovernment to the private Se(tOr!
This outcome is, ofcourse, the obverse of the phenomenon
commented upon earlier, that the existence ofindexed governnient bondsresults ina return to the public ofa great part of the receipts fromprice-raising taxes via indexatjon. But, whileindexatiori would, in anycase, cause the base of the inflation tax to shrink, itcould not by itself eliminate itcompletely and certainly not turn it negative.Indeed, indexation did not reducethe volume of the unindexedpart of the money base in Brazil,which remainedmore or less constant at 5-6 percent of GDPbetween 1966 and 1973.'It was, thus, the rapidexpansion of unindexecj loans grantedby the publicsector that almost wipedout the inflation tax.
(IVJ CONCLUSIONS
The two countries whereindexation has been widelypracticed in recent
years, Brazil and Israel, differconsiderably in their economicdevelopment and their social andpolitical structure. Despitethis (and perhapsbecause of it),the similarities anddifferences in the way inwhich indexation worked in the twocountries may allow us to drawsonic conclusions regarding its operation ingeneral.
The first, most strikingsimilarity is in the effects ofinflation on thecapital markets. Some of these, likethe charging of high bankingcommissions the tying of loans to collateraldeposits, and the outflow offunds from hank deposits into the billbrokerage (or, in Brazil, theIetras de camb,o)market, can to a great extent beattributed to the existencein both Countriesof usury laws restricting thenominal rate of interest. But,given the uncer- tainty involved,tis most doubtful whetherthe virtual disappearanceof long-term lending andborrowing could have beenavoided even in their absence.
The other similarcharacteristic less oftennoted, is that in bothcountries indexation, of financialinstruments at least, didnot spread until after inflation began todecelerate. Indexed bondswere first issued in Brazilin 1964, the year pricesrose by 92 percent. But,quantitatiteIy speaking, they were hardly in evidence before1966 or 1967, wheninflation was already down to 40 and 24percent per annum,respectively In Israel, the firstissue of indexed bondsappeared on the marketin 1955, when inflationwas only 6 percent, far belowits 58 percentI)eak of 1952. Casualempiricism would suggest that indexation doesnot affect the rate ofinflation: in the first fifteen years afterits introduction in Israel,annual inflation averagedonly S percent, while in Brazilit decreased from25 Percentper annum in the years 1967-1968 to 16percent in 1972-1973Yet in neithercountry did itMonetary CorrectiO1an(I Indexation
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prevent prices asmeasured b the (MSt.oi.livingindex, fromrising by more
than 40 percent in1974.
A closer scrutinyreveals that indexatjonproper waspracticed to a much
lesser extentthan is sometimes suggested. The
impression oftotal jcJex
tion in Brazilis partly due to the very broadsense in which theterm monetary correctionis used there, to Coverpractically all changesin nominal values in which some official index is usedas a guideline..
particularly the use of the term to describe
payments compensating for
expected, as well as experienced, price developments
Furthermore,
post indexation is sometimes restricted by ceiling clauses, and
discretion-
ary governmentintervention seems to be Irequent.The moreautomatic
type of indexation practiced in Israel, on the other hand, turnedout to be
politically difficult to maintain, and was in fact abandonedas far as most of
the government's debtors are concerned. Thus, it cannot beargued that
either of the systems (Oflipared here provides a real-lifeexample of a fully
indexed economy. Their experience may even ind:cate thattotal indexa-
tion, whatever its drawbacks or merits, is politically unattainableit may
well be that further research, both theoretical and empirical,should pay
more attention to the problems of partial than to those of total indexation.
With respect to the indexed sector itself, there is the questionwhether
indexation should be homogeneousi.e., with identical conditionsand the
same index. Differences in the availability of supplementary mechanisms
do, on the face ofit,justify differential indexation. But thestory of
mortgage indexation in both countriesisillustrative of the social and
political considerations that may make uniform procedures, anda single
index, preferable to economically more sophisticated methods.
In both countries, the inflation tax base was found to have been almost
completely eliminated. However, especially in Israel, thiswas due not so
much to indexation of the public debt as to abstention from itin govern-
ment credits. It was the result of the belief in state intervention which, for
alltheir political dissimilarity, characterized the governments of both
countries. In niore market-oriented economies indexation would probably
not be accompanied by so much discretionary action. But the potential
size of the subsidy that can be granted inthis manner may make it (liffiCUlt
to resist even for less intervention-prone governments.
Elimination of the inflation tax has been one of the main arguments
against indexationfor thisis really what the inflationary feedback as-
cribed to it amounts to.It has been suggested that inflation tax may he
preferable to the alternative taxes considered. But the resulting transfer of
purchasing power from the private to the public sector is only a by-product
of much greater redistributionvithiin the private sector itself. When this is
taken into account the inflationtax has little to recommend it, atleast on
equity grounds, Although thetax is the way in whichinflation may playS
itself out "naturally," theaccompanying redistribution effectsare IJiecisely
the reason why inflationis generally regarded as undesirable,
Finally, it Is worthwhile tocompare the direction in whichindexation has spread in the two countriesconsidered here. In Brazil, inrlexationwas originally restricted to capital.Wages were for a long timecompletely tinindexed, and even the formulaemployed in recent years doesnot allow for their monetary correctionto the extent allowed for capital. InIsrael, on the other hand, wageswere indexed many years before financialinstru ments. Thus,inIsrael indexatjon was introducedprimarily for equity
considerations, the protection of laborincome; in Brazil, it wasintroduced primarily for allocativeconsiderations enhancement of capitalaccumula
tion and improvement of its allocationPolitical attitudes in bothcountries probably had much to do with theorder in which indexationwas adopted
(It is perhaps indicative of theIsraeli attitude that savingsaccounts were the last to be indexed.) Yet, underthe pressure of economic andsocial forces, sooner or later both had tomove away from their originalPositions: Israeltoward the inclexation offinancial assets, Braziltowardsome measure of true, ex-post indexationof wages.It has sometimes been
suggested that if more highlydeveloped countries are tointroduce indexa- tion, they should doso on equity grounds only, and limititto the protection of the weaker andmore vulnerable members of society;or else that they should restrictit to very long-term debts,extreme misallocation5 of which are difficultto remedy by othermeans. The Brazilian and Israeli
experiences indicate that suchselective indexationmay be impossible in practice.
NOTES
The thirdisFinland. Until the recent worldwideupsurge in inflationary trends, the
experience of these countries hardlymerited a mentioniiithe general economic literature and even now littlematerial on it is accessibleto the English-speaking reader. [A description of the Finnishexper:ence has recently become availablein S. Mukherjee lndexajjon in an Inflationary Economy,A Case Study of Finland (London:PEP, 1975)1It is perhaps a sign of the culture-boundnature of our profession thata pioneering exposition of the subject, the lateAmotz Morag's "For anlnflation.proof Economy" lAmer,can Econom, Review,LII (March 1962(, 177-185jreceived little attention at the time.
The assumption underlyingthis resultis that individuals consider thedispersion of possible changes in purchasingpower to be greater under inflation thanunder price stabilityIt may be noted thatit is the effects of inflationaryexpectations which are thus seen to have a real cost attached
to them, irrespective of whetheror not they ultimately materialize. See Dwight Jalfeeand Ephraim Kleiman"The Welfare Implications of Uneven Inflation," Institutefor InternationalEconomic Studies SeminarPaper No. 50, Stockholm, University ofStockholm, 1975.







reprinted in that author's Stidiein Monetary Economics
(New York Harperand Row,
1972).
Thusin answering demands br linkage, the chairman ofwhat w themc- tix- country s largest bankwhich forrnaiiy ran theissue department)retorted that'if we, whose name appears on the banknotes lose trustrthCurrency how canwe expect the public to sustain it:'
A precedent may be said tohave beeii set by theNational Eoan raisedby the lewish Agency in the spring of 1948. But this linkage reflected the monetary
interregnuns which accompanied the termination of the British Mandate for
Palestine and the fact thatthe loan was guaranteed by the Agencys future dollar receipts
Nevertheless, some agricultural develotsment loans continued tobe granted unlinked.
For a description of the early origins of the linkage of financial assets in
Israel see Alex
Rubner, "The Abdication of the lsraeh Pound as a Standard of
Measurement for
Medium- and Long-Term Contracts," Review of Economic Studies,XXVttt (October
1960), 69-75; and Marshall Sarnat, The Development of the Securities Marketh'j Israel
)Basel and Tiibingen: Kvklos-Verlag and J. C. B. Mohr, 1966).
From the government's point of view, the situation was further complicatedby the
intoduct:on of a pol!cy of minidevaluatioris in lune 1975.
The Collective Agreements Law of 1957 empowered the Minister of Laborto issue
regulations extending the force of the wage indexation agreements tononsignatories,
and this has become regular practice since 1959.
See, for example, Bank of Israel, Annual Report, 1%3, p. 186.
It was not possible to estimate directly the number ol employees whose wages exceed
the ceiling or the share of the unindexed svage component. One estimate put the share
of the wage bill not covered by COLA at 35 percent in 1962, of which about half
represented employees outside the COLA agreement and half represented theexcess of
actual wages over the ceiling. (See Bank of Israel, Annual Report, 1962, pp. 164-165.) It
should, however, be pointed out thatin 1962 adjustment of the ceiling was long
overdue, so that this figure should be regarded as the upper boundary of the estimate of
uncompensated ss'ages. Another Slu(ly revealed that betsveen 1957 and 1969 the
average wage actually paid amounted to only between 40 and 60 percent of that
calculated on the basis of the ceiling PlUs the maximum COLA. See Y. 1-indling, "The
History of the Cost-of-Living Allowance" (unpublished seminar paper, The Hebrew
University, 175: Hebrew).)
H. The tax reform of July 1975, which provided for the readjustment of tax brackets with
changes in the price level, also recommended putting the allowance on a par with all
other income for personal tax purposes.
During the period of repressed inflation in 1949-1951 the government even succeeded
in obtaining a reduction in COLA in this way. This manipulation of the index seems to
be very similar to the Finnish practice of "buying-off index points." See Bruno Suviranta,
'A Unique Experiment in Escalated Wages," B,inca Nazionale del Las'oro Quarterly
Review, No. 54 (September 1960), PP 265-282.
When the weights of the index accurately represent the bundle actually purchased by
consumers, and the index and the COLA are calculated from a comparison of average
price levels rather than from point estimates, such buying-off lowers the "true" cost of
wing, and shoulrl not be regarded as a manipulation.
For a concise description of the mechanism through which the funds mobiiied by
financial institutions are directed by the government, see Bank of Israel, Annual Report,
1973, Chapter XIV.
This concession applies to all government bonds in Israel, whether indexed or not.
Because of the ceiling on the interest rate imposed by the usury lasv (then still inforce)
and because of government restrictions on the volume nf credit granted by the banks,tie latter otiiid it more protitable at thenoviiiierate as 1)111 hrokirthan to attract
loiig-t'rni (f('pi'isItsOr th0 iiirpr.itkr'idr iig thvnr uriC
2'"ale, br ecample, \-\1rner Bier and Paul Fttu k,'iriia,r'infl,i turn wi thotit>itu,.,,s'Sri
EEvaluatiim ot Brazil's Indeiiiit System'' and Pedro I iiioll,inowl "'Or 0'.1.\t
lndexat,on 01 Wages: Some Asptv Is ot the Brazil,an F \perrl'nce(apers pn'srn-itat tireIl'I - N B FR Scm oar Oniu lox a lion So I'a i; lo, h hoi,irv 26 -28,I 97'St
I 8.Ephra mi K lei man andI cvi ()ph i r,The I )e tvrm nat ion of Money Wages'Thy iii 'ho0
Llmversity, 1970; minicograph)
Baer and Beckerman, op. cit.; M. H. Sirnonsenand R. do Oliveira ('anipocf/i1.ieis Brazilian fconi en y (Rio de Janein), nd,) I)I), 85-87.
Had this hen due Ii)purely economic forces,it could have h)POflinberfireteti as evicteri( e that the onech,ioisiç deterniinirig realwages operated in the Opt')5te direction
to that of the monetary corre('tiori.I lowover, as the redir(-tion 01 realwages 'vas
regarded by the Bra zili an ai ilhori tiesas a main instrument Of anti - i ntlat inriary poliiv, it
cannot lx ascribed to the tree operatron of market forces.(Finance Minister Sinionsen
in Simonsen and de OIivira Campos, op. cit..p. 87( refers to the Wage torniula as 'one
of the main props of Brazilian policy for fighting inflation.')
2 1.Neglec I irg the tiroihtit ii fs','ros th sdemen I 00(1 1 lie tWo-year hOst' 1)1 thei colain, th Brat Ii an torniu)a reduces to
--------o,gi)5,,r
ivhere i, is the nf)ation rate whichwas expected for perincl ri and i'is the (InC actual ly
experienced. The ratio term isa correction for past under- oroverestimation of i Simonen in Simonsen arid (IC (')liveiraCanipos, op. cit
Bank ot Israel, 4rinof Reports1969 and 1973, Table lV-2.
Thsta tenent CIra sw OnI lie 01010(iIa) led iiit tics 'ciiiProvided in Rt'pi yr o ('isnrnirorr (IfI 5p'rtit 0)11/ring !'ltr)tin' ('oct-it-Hi tic''\lloii .ini i'Id.'\s iv,I 906 I lebrety),
The commission which suggestedhis recent revision in the COLA didnot claimth,it external effects necessarilyaccount for 30 percent of total price changes,only that this was their share actually excluded from COLAcon'iputafioris in the last Vearthrough discretionary action and act-hocnegotiations. They did, however, stresstl'iat,un)rk financialinkage, the indexation ofcx agesan always he supplemented by theother mechanisms of the labor market,At the same time, the commission alsorccommencJ that the adJustment interval shouldbe shortened to three months: thattheeiling should be gradually abolished; that thefull COt should be taken incomputing the COt A arid that its payment shouldnot be subject to ad-hoc negotiationsor discretionary action See Report of the (Ooiflh(Ssioflto frtirne the ('I )L .4 Ilon'rm-Provisions 'k'rucalmni I 975; Hebrew)
See, for example. Cipollari andMa edo op. Cit.
For the volume of indexedinstruments in Brazil. see t3arir'oentral rio Brasi I, Ri'l,itdrr dnoal 1074, It should he pointednot that Ii rite di'posi ts in Brazil aronot indexed in the sense in which the term is us.cl here. ForIsrael see Bank of Israel, AnnualReport, 1974, for the volume of savings deposits,and Israel, State Comptroller,Annual Report, No 25 for (974 (Hebrew), tor indexedgocernment debt at end of March 1974. Thelatter figure was deflated for the pricerise since December 1973. '(heCorrestxmding money supply and GOP figures are Cr$ 93,835and 477,163 million,respectively in Brazil, and It. 7,392 and 38,695 million in Israel.









o, Banco Central do Brasil, Os).t, arid IsraelState Comptroller
0p Also, it has been assumed that all housing I)Oflds Woir h
tire indexed,iO ri Brait held by the public, while in Israel, the Sii1fld5'iii)ption "as madeihot theuriiilexrxi government Shui l-Teiiii i.i)dii.1 li)W('Vertliligure for inchxi?d
bond holdingsof the Israeli public Includes those held by unit trust fur)
and by the Voluntary
Pension funds of the self-employed; these Were treated as a proxy for direct
holdings.> The Israel compulsory loans should not he comparedto the Brazilianforced savings through FGTS, P15, and PASEP, which are sociOl
Security funds, whoseIsraeli count parts are the National Insurance Institute and the provident
funds of betrade unions Moreover, some of the compulsory loan Certificates
were already tradableat the time.
33,About five times as high as in Brazil.
If liquid balances are related to total resources as aproxy for the volume oi
transactions) rather than to ir,conie, the difference belween the tWO
countries IS reversj Relativeto total resources for domestic uses (GDP plus the importsurplus) liquidassets exclusive of indexed bonds amounted to 29 percent in Israel,as against 29 to 37percent depending on the definition used, in Brazit.
See Ronald j. McKinnon, Money ,ind Lipaal in Economic
Deve!oprnen) (\Vashington The Brookings Institution, 1973).
8y recent world standards, and certainly by those of Brazilin the early 1960s, theperiod in which debt indexation was practiced in Israel svas one of rathermild inflationIt was only in t971 that, for the first time since 1954, the risein the CPI exceeded 10percent. This is the order of magnitude of the increases inthe general and svholesaleprice indexes and their main components. Estimates of tireincrease in the cost-of-livingindex lwhich is the index cited here for IsraelI were for theroost part considerably higher,
though they varied from as little as 13-14percent in Rio de laneiro and BeloHorizonte to as much as 21 percent in Porto A!egre, 28percent in Brasilia, and 33 percent in
Curitiba.
Total exciusive of acceptance (i.e., alternative B ofTal)lec 1and 2L This increase
occurred despite the considerable decline, whichpersisted until 1973, in the share of
ORTNs held by the general public. It is noteworthy thatthe acceleration of the inflation
ratio to about 35 percent in 1974 coincided witha sudden tump in this proportion,
which resulted in a 5 to 6 percentincrease in the share of indexed assets in the public's
liquid holdings.
See below for a comparison of indexationpractices in the two countries. According to at
least one author, it was only in 1974 that ''indexedbonds for the first time became more
attractive to the private saver than nonjndexc-d paper" lack D.Guenther, " 'Indexing'
versus Discretionary Action Brazil's Fight Against Inflation," Finance andDevelopment.
XII (No. 3, September 1975),25-291, That the improved adjustability of nominal rates
did, most probably, providea substitute for inclexation is also evident from the near
doubling between 1966 and 1973of the ratio of total unindexed assets to GDP.
Albert Fishlow, "Indexing BrazilianStyle: Inflation without Tears?" Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity (No. 1,1974), p. 263.
4LSee, for example, José RobertoNijvaesIc' Alnseida, 'liidexalion of O.R.T.N.'s: Manners
of Calculation' Con,rjnturafcon(rnjca XX\'lli (December 1974), 92-95. iEnglish trans-
lation presentedas background material for the IPE-NB[R Seminar on tndexation, Sn
Paulo, February 26-28,1975.)
To offset the delayin the availability of price statistics, the Brazilian government has
resorted in recent years to theimputation of the forecast rate of inflation for the two
months preceding the monthof pur hase and the month of redemptionBut as no
correctionis made ex post for faulty forecasts, this does not constitute a proper
indexalion procedure(compare the discussion above of the use of the forecast rate in the
wage formula>.
Correction on Brazilian housing bonds is paid quarterly. In Israel, one eight-year bond paid eti mu ated I nu'rr'st andi rid (sat m d ffi'ri'riti ii', i'vi'rtourpars, rather
tlia n at nlatu ri ty.
We should ri ote herr- the are& i nient that monetary ( on ci tiin diii'siit rca Iviri' owe th
i ndividij a swea I th, for it5 u tim atel y p il out of extra axes. See tot esa Flit) Ic Robert I.
B arro, ''Are Government Bonds Net Wea liii'Ji n,rn,i I of Pc litF( a! I 000mt xxx
(Noveni her/DecemberI 974;I 09 - III 7, for the appl ( atoii of Iiiargil merit to the
public debt iii general-But this view 5I'('FI ist( Frest (Iii a tal atY Ofooipositontile
personal distribution of taxes is not known with (ert,i I nty in adva ix', a id an i nitividu al
decision to purchase a government bond does net necessarily ,itfevthis Iiituir' tax
liability.
For a change in the public's attitude toward indexed bonds see, e.g.. Bank of Israel,
Annual Report. 1974. I am grateful tc, Paul Beckernian for pointing out that the develop-
ment described here may be cited with equal success in support of the opposite view
that money balances should be indexed as well, since there is no jtistific,itinn, except
that of implementation costs, for levying the inflation tax on cash holdings but noton
other financial assets.
IIis assumed here that interest rates abroad fail to adjust to the nh Ider inflation rates
prevailing therewhich seems indeed to have been the case in recent years. As itis
usually the government which 'borrows linked,'' the influx ot foreign funds need not
result in a dec-line in domestic interest rates which ivould cancel the indexation gains.
Baer and Beckerman, op. cit. The foreign purchaser (if Brazilian OR1 Ns enjoys in
addition a hedge against devaluation through tile exchange rate linkage option these
bonds offer.
For a short period in the mid-l96Os new mortgages were in fact linked to the COLA. See
A. Cukierman, Index-Linked Mortgages in israel (Foerder Institute Working Paper No.
60; Tel Aviv: Tel-Aviv tiniversit',', 1974).
Compare Ingemar Sthl, ''The Rise and Fall of Index Loans in Sweden,'' .Skaothriayjska
Enskilcla Bankeri Quarterly Review (No.I, 1975), 14-20.
Baer and Beckerman, op. cit. For the legal maximum interest rates on certaintypes of
"indexed" credits, see Banco Central do Brasil, Re!atOrio Anual 1974,pp. 56-59.
St.See laffee and Kleiman, op. cit. Similar results were obtained for the other eleven
countries examined there. Note, incidentally, that unless it increases with inflation, the
lag of the producer's own price behind the general price level should reducethe
attractiveness of borrowing in general, but not the relative attractiveness of ''borrowing
linked."
In the early1 960s, income tax brackets were defined in Brazil as multiples of the
nhininlum wage. Later, either the minimum wage or the pnce level were used in
adlusting income lax brackets. But these served as guidelines rather thanas automatic
rules. See Guenther, op. cit.
Thts is accompanied by a considerable transfer of purchasingpower within the private
sector as well. Here, however, we are interested in the net inflationtax and therefore
deduct that part of ;t internalized by the private bankingsystem.
See Affonso C. Pastore et al.,'Reflections about the Brazilian Experience(In Indexation"
(preliniinry version, n.d.1975)).
Excluded were credits in foreignurrency and those linked to the exchange rate.
Estimated as in Table 3, exctusive of unindexedtreasury obligations held by the public.
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